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DEVIATION AND DEPARTURE BY SERVANT
Under the doctrine of "respondeat superior" the master is
liable for negligent acts of his servant occurring in the course
of and within the scope of his employment. This doctrine had its
origin in public policy and rests on the principle that it is more
just to make the person who has intrusted his servant with the
power of acting in his business, responsible for injury occasioned
to another in the course of so acting, than that the other and entirely innocent party should bear the loss. Clearly the liability
of the master does not ektend to acts done solely for the servant's
own purposes. *Where a servant steps aside from the master's
business for however short a time to do an act disconnected from
it and an injury results from such independent act, the master
is not liable.1 However, a slight deviation by the servant for
his own purposes when he is on business for his master does not2
excuse the master though the injury occurs during the detbur.
The difficulty arises in determining whether the servant's
act was an entire departure f om the employment or only a
roundabout way of doing the master's business. If there was
clearly an abandonment of the master's business or if the deviation was very slight the court may determine the, master's
liability or non-liability; but cases falling between the two exI Stone v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44, 29 Am. Rep. 635 (1877). This was
clearly a case of departure. The defendant sent a servant on an errand
of four miles, with instructions as to return route. On his arrival, the
person to whom he had been sent requested him to go four miles further
on business for him. The injury occurred when the servant reached
his second destination, and it was held that the servant was not acting
in the course of his employment. Other departure cases are: Mitchell
v. (yrasswelter,13 C. B. 236 (1853): Mcarty v. Tim.mins, 178 Mass. 378,
59 N. E. 1038 (1901); Eakin's Admr. v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 1, 183 S. W.
217 (1916); Healey v. Corkri7l, 133 Ark. 327, 202 S. W. 229 (1918).
In Phelon v. Stiles, 43 Conn. 426 (1876), the act causing the injury
was done for the servant's own purposes but was also in the scope of
his employment. The defendant flour merchant employed a servant
to make deliveries for him. The servant left bags of bran by the road
while he went up a side road to make a delivery, intending to take the
bran on his return. His object was to save unnecessary transportation
of bran in order that he might finish earlier and have time to attend
to his own business. Plaintiff's horse became frightened at the bags
by the road and was injured. The defendant was held liable as a matter
of law. See also, Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co., 174 Wis. 486 (1921)';
Tyler v. Stephan?'s Administratrix,163 Ky. 770, 174 S.W. 790 (1915).
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tremes involve a question of fact for the jury.3 It is in this
third situation that the conflict arises. The question is what
issues shall determine and what elements shall be considered in
determining whether the deviation from the master's business
has been great enough to constitute an abandonment and a
frolic of the servant's own which will excuse the master from
tort liability.
In 1834 the words "frolic" and "detour" were first used
in JoeZ v. Morrison4 by Parke, B., who ruled that "if a servant
wag going out of his way against his master's implied command
while driving on his master's business he will make the master
liable; but if he was going on a frolic of his own without being
on his master's business the master will not be liable." Since
this time courts have been trying to find an adequate test for determining whether the servant was on a detour or frolic at the
time the injury occurred. Decisions have rested on the distance of the detour with respect to the distance the servant was
supposed to go, or whether the servant origindlly started in his
master's business, and on his purpose to return to his place of
employment. Some courts have said that the circumstances of
the case must determine the liability and that no definite criteria
can be applied to every case.5 A test often used is whether the
servant's objective is some goal he was employed to attain. 6
3Ritchie v. Wailer, 63 Conn. 255, 28 Atl. 29 (1893). Defendant's
servant went a few blocks out Of the direct route of his master's business to have his own shoes repaired. While In the shop the team he
was driving ran away and injured the plaintiff. The jury found as a
matter of fact that the servant was acting in the scope of his employment and had merely deviated. See also, International Go. v. Clark,
147 Md. 34, 127 AtI. 647 (1925).
*6 C. & P. 501 (1834). The plaintiff was knocked down by the
negligent driving of defendant's servant. It was proved that defendant's cart was not in the habit of being driven into the city where the
injury occurred. The instructions were "if the servant, on his master's
business took a detour to call on a friend the master is responsible;
but if he was going on a frolic of his own the master is not liable."
5Edwards v. Earnest, 206 Ala. 1, 89 So. 729 (1921); Riley v. Stan-lard Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921); Atkins v. Points, 748
La. 958, 88 So. 231 (1921).
oMcCarty -v. Timmins, 178 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 1038 (1901). The
driver of defendant's carriage was ordered to take it to the barn. He
went a short distance in the opposite direction to a saloon, leaving the
horse unhitched and causing injury to plaintiff. The master was not
liable, the court holding that "the rule as to the extent of the liability
of the master Is that if the servant was not acting for the purpose of
doing his work he Is not liable."
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Under it the master is held responsible where the servant's
dominant purpose is the performing of the master's business,
though he makes a detour for purposes of his own. In other
words, to hold the master liable the servant must have been
acting within the course of and scope of his employment.
Most of the above mentioned criteria are clearly inadequate. It would be impossible to reconcile all the decisions, or
to give a reasonable basis for using the distance test. A servant
may have departed for a short distance and time and still be
on a frolic, 7 or he may have taken a more roundabout route and
be on a detour.8 Clearly the master is not liable if the servant
started out on business of his own,9 but this is not a case of
departure or abandonment, and does not furnish any basis for
determining the master's liability where the servant deviated
or departed from his employment. Likewise, if a servant, after
starting out on business for his master, completely abandons it
with no intention of returning, the master cannot be held liable,
but this does not furnish any test for determining whether the
servant has abandoned his employment or not.
The dominant purpose test is based on sound logic and if
the purpose could be determined it would be a good criterion.
However, it is impractical because the servant usually has a dual
purpose and it is impossible to determine what was the motivating one at the time The accident occurred. The servant, wishing
to relieve his master of liability, would be inclined to say he was
actuated by purely personal motives at the time even though he
also had his master's business in mind. On the other hand, the
servant might even be on the prescribed route at the time of
the injury and not intend to fulfill the errand on which he was
sent. In such case the master should not be relieved of liability,
yet by the above stated test he would be.
The deficiencies of the dominant purpose test may be
demonstrated by the confusion and conflicting decisions in juris-

7See-note

6, supra.

I Cummings v. Repulbic Truck Co., 135 N. E. (Mass. 1922) 134. In
this case the servant went four miles for purposes of his own, and was
held not to have completely abandoned his employment.
IBaunder's Exors. v. Armour d Co., 220 Ky. 719, 295 S. W. 1014
(1927). An employee of defendant company took one of the automobiles belonging to the company to go to his home, and when returning

to work the next morning ran over the plaintiff's testator. The defendant was not liable.
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dictions, using it. In Seidle v. Knop, 1° a truck driver in the
employ of the defendant digressed from the right to the lea
side of the road to pick up the plaintiff and by his negligent
driving injured him. The court held that the driver, in going
from the right to the left side of the road, abandoned his master's
employment and relieved the defendant from liability. The
servant had two objectives, picking up the plaintiff and completing the trip on whioh he had been sent, and this court held
that picking up the plaintiff was the predominant one at the
time of the accident. In another case 1 in the same jurisdiction
it was decided that driving around a block to see a friend was a
mere deviation. An early English case using the purpose doctrine allowed a driver to detour four miles. 1 2 In Gulf Refining
Co.v. Texarkana & Ft..S. Raslway Co.,13 the defendant's truck
driver in returning from a trip pursuant to his duty deviated
from his route, intending to go to his home several blocks
distant for lunch and later return to his employer's warehouse.
The accident occurred during the trip home, about two blocks
from his route, and the court held that his dominant purpose
was still to perform the duties of his employment, aid that the
trip home was a mere deviation. It seems impossible to reconcile these cases and many similar ones on the basis of the dominant purpose of the driver or to say which is the correct holding. It is impossible to determine what was the driver's motive
and intention at the time of the accident.
Dean Pound has said "there is a strong and growing tendency to ask, in -view of the exigencies of social justice, who
can best bear the loss and hence to shift the loss by creating
liability where there has been no fault. ' 4 A broader and more
elastic test is needed to meet this modern view. The basis for
fixing liability suggested by Professor Y. B. Smith'5 seems to
Wis. 397, 182 N. W. 980 (1921).
u Thomas v. Lockwood OiZ Co., 174 Wis. 486, 182 N. W. 841 (1921).
12
Beath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 505 (1839).
261 S. W. 169, Tex.. Civ. App. (1924).
""The End of Law," 27 Harv. L. Rev. 233.
"Frolic and Detour," 23 Columbia Law Review, 724. Under this
test the court would be allowed greater fre6dom In fixing the liability.
-Even though the servant has gone a little beyond the place of his
master's business, on a purpose of his own, the master can be held, because In view of the nature of servants this might have been expected.
It Is a risk the master should take.
10 174
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be the one most in accord with this tendency, and also with the
underlying economic principles of "respondeat superior."
This test is whether the servant was in the zone of his employment at the time of the accident. The zone might be defined
as the radius in which under all the circumstances the servant
might be expected to go. To render the master liable the conduct of his business must have been a contributing cause of the
serkant's act in starting out. The real question, however, would
be "whether in view of what the servant was actually employed
to do it was probable that he would do what he did,' 6 rather
than whether his motive at the time a master sends a servant on
business in a vehicle he necessarily exposes third parties to
danger both from ,xpressly authorized acts and from such
deviation as a servant would be likely to make under the circumstances. It is quite as essential that the third parties have
redress for injuries occurring through negligence of the servant
on the deviation as for those occurring on the direct route. It is
only just that the master pay for ipjuries occurring in a radius
where it might be contemplated from the nature of the employment and of servants in general that they would occur.
"This criterion is broad enough in its scope to include various
tests that have been formerly used. To determine whether the
deviation was probable, whether the servant was in the zone of
his employment, circumstances of location in time and space,
the distance the servant was supposed to go, and the distance
he actually went would be important. He must have had the
furtherance of his employment in mind in starting out to render
the master liable. In some cases the extent of the departure is
so clearly disproportionate to the distance of the trip as to entirely remove the servant from the employment. This was true
in Fleischner v. Durgin'7, where the servant was sent to a shop
less than a mile away and drove six miles out of the way for a
chain for his own use. Circumstances of travel must also be considered. If a servant is sent on a route which would not take
him to a city and he goes to a crowded portion of the city, the

""Frolic

and Detour," supra note 15.
1 207 Mass. 435, 93 N. E. 801 (1911).
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master should not be held. The servant takes a risk that was not
contemplated by the master.' s
In Fleischman Company v. Howe,1 9 the plaintiff was injured when an employee of the defendant had deviated about
two blocks from the route of a forty block delivery trip for the
purpose of getting money from his home, and the employer was
held liable. In D'Aleria v. Shirey,20 when a servant was told to
take a car to the garage and he deviated several blocks for purposes of his own the master was held liable for injuries occurring
on the detour. These are typical cases. It would be impossible
to say that the servant's dominant purpose in these cases at the
time the injury occurred was the conduct of the master's business, yet the master should be held. Such decisions might better be based on the fact that the servant was in the zone of his
employment.
There is a difference of opinion as to when a servant who
has abandoned his master's business and departed on a mission
of his own resumes his employment, and this difference is due
to the diversity of tests for deviation and departure. The
courts which hold that the primary test is the dominant purpose
of the servant would logically hold that when the servant has
completed the purpose for which he turned aside and is returning to his duties he is, while so returning, engaged in the business of his master. After his own purpose is accomplished his
dominant purpose is usually the conduct of his employer's business. Louisiana courts have held that "when the servant, having completed the purpose for which he turned aside, is returning to resume duties', he is while so returning engaged in
business for his master. '" 2 1 In Barmore v. Vicksburg,22 the
servant deviated two miles for a purpose not in the line of his employment. The inj'ury occurred while returning to the prescribed
route, and the master was held liable because the servant's mind
" Mathewson v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 232 Mass. 576,
122 N. E. 743. "It should be considered that an automobile can be run
over smooth ways where there is little traffic more safely and quickly
than over rough roads."
29213 Ky. 110, 280 S. W. 496 (1926).
2 286 Fed. 523 (1923).
2Duffy v. Hickey, 151 La. 274, 91 So. 737 (1922); Cusimano v.
Spiess Sales Co., 153 La. 551, 96 So. 118 (1923).
'-85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210 (1905).
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at the time was turned toward the furtherance of the master's
business.
Professor Mechem criticises these decisions because the
servant was only returning to resume his employment and
had not returned. 23 But the servant's purpose at the time was
to accomplish his .master's business, and using the dominant
purpose test there seems no logical reason for holding otherwise. The weight of authority is with Professor Mechem and
supports the view. that the servant does not enter the scope of
his employment until the zone has been reached. 2 4 Where the
emphasis is placed on the zone of employment rather than the
servant's purpose, he is held not to have returned to his
master's service "until he has at least reached a point in a zone
within which his labor would have been consistent with an act
of deviation merely, had the original act been such in its other
circumstances as to have been one of deviation and not of temporary abandonment. ' 25 In other words, the master is liable
only when the servant has returned to a point at which he would
have been liable had the servant been starting out on the detour.
The strongest argument for .the zone test is that it better
harmonizes and gives a real basis for the majority rule that a
servant has not necessarily entered his employment again when
he has accomplished his own mission and is returnilag. InCarder v. Martin,26 where the agent, after fulfilling his errand,
set out on an independent mission wholly unconnected with
the employer's business, and the injury oeurred while he was
returning to his employment, the employer was not held liable.
The servant had no goal other than that of his employment. The
holding is correct but should be based on the fact that the agent
had not reached the zone of his employment. In Riley v.
"Mechem on Agency," Sec. 1900.
"Fioco v. Carver, 234 N. Y. 219, 137 N. E. 309 (1922).
"Dockweiler v. American Piano Co., 160 N. Y. S. 270 (1916).

Defendant's servant abandoned his employment to drink intoxicants and
afterwards started to defendant's garage by way of his home, as was
customary. Plaintiff was injured on the way to the garage. The court
held that the servant had returned to the zone of his employment.
2250 Pac. (Okla.) 906 (1926).
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Standard Oil C0.27 there is dicta to the effect that a "re-entry
into the master's business is not effected merely by the mental
,attitude of the servant. There must be a reasonable connection
in time and space. It cannot be said that he again becomes a
servant only when he reaches a point which he would have
passed had he obeyed orders. He may choose a different way
back." This dicta supports the view that the servant must be
in the zone of employment and that the mere purpose of the
driver cannot be the determining factor.
Kentucky courts have seemingly based their decisions on
the dominant purpose of the servant. In most of the cases where
there is dicta to this effect, the servant really started out on' a
mission of his own and using any criteria the master would
not be liable.2 8 In Wyatt v. Hodson,2 9 a salesman took out a
car to demonstrate it to a proposed customer who was not at his
office when the salesman called. The salesman then used the
car for personal purposes, going one-half mile beyond the route
required by service. By either the purpose test or the zone test
the master would be relieved of liability, and in this case either
would seem logical. As has been previously shown,8 0 in Fleischman Co. v. Howe the holding is correct but can be better justified by the zone test than the. domilant purpose test. Kentucky
holds with the majority, that a servant who has abandoned his
master's business does not necessarily re-enter his employment
after he has accomplished his personal mission and is returning
to his master's business.8 1 This holding cannot be justified by
the dominant purpose test, and should be based on the zone
-2 3 1 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921). The facts are as follows: A
chauffeur went two and one-half miles to the freight yard for paint.
After loading the truck he drove four blocks out of the way for purposes
of his own and on his way back, before reaching the freight yard, the
accident occurred. The master was held liable and this decision can
be justified by the fact that he had entered the zone of employment.
28 Tyler v. Stephan's Administratrix, 163 Ky. 770, 174 S. W. 790
(1915); Eakin's Admr. v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 1, 183 S. W. 217 (1916);
Keck's Adm'r v. Louisville Gas & Electric 6o., 179 Ky. 314, 205 S. W.
452 (1918); Saunder's Ex'rs. v. Armour-& Go., 220 Ky. 719, 295 S. W.
1014 (1927).
210 Ky.47, 275 S. W. 15 (1925).
"See note 19, supra."
rady v. Greer, 183 Ky. 675, 210 S. W. 167 (1919). A chauffeur,
directed to make a certain trip and return, when nearly home went in
the opposite direction on his own account. When returning, but further
from home than when he abandoned his master's services, he collided
with the plaintiff. The master was not liable.
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test. Thus it can be seen that in most cases the holding would
be the same, using the dominant purpose test or the zone test,
but the latter would give a more reasonable basis for the decision.
To summarize, the zone test seems best for the, following
reasons:
1. It is in accord with the fundamental principles of"respondeat superior" and is best as a matter of public policy.
The master is better able to bear the loss. He exposes others to
danger from such deviation as a servant would be likely to make,
and should bear the loss.
2. The purpose test is not adequate because so often the
purpose cannot be determined, and it has led to great conflict in
decisions.. The zone test does not lead to such conflict because
whether the servant is in the probable radius of his employment is a question of fact that can be determined more easily
than the intention of the servant.
3. This test is broad enough in its scope to include others,
and to fit any circumstances of detour or departure.
4. It gives a basis for the majority rule that a servant has
not necessarily entered his employment again when he has accomplished his own nussion and is returning.
ELIZABETH
Lexington, Kentucky.

TunER ROUSE.

